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Assuming no adjustments in the denominator as noted
above,11 the inclusion ratio would be
   I.R.  = 1 – 0.6
          = 0.4
Thus, any taxable distributions or terminations from
that trust would be subject to tax at a rate of —
= 0.4 x .55
= .22
The GSTT would be imposed on that trust at a rate of
22 percent.
After 1992, the maximum rate of 55 percent is scheduled
to drop to 50 percent.12 The additional 5 percent estate and
gift tax surcharge for portions of estates exceeding $10
million does not apply for purposes of the generation
skipping transfer tax.13
Who pays the tax.  The question of who pays the
tax varies with whether a trust is involved and whether it is
a direct skip, taxable termination or taxable distribution.14
•  For a direct skip not from a trust, the transferor pays
the tax.15
•  For a direct skip from a trust, the tax is paid by the
trustee.16
•  For a taxable termination, the tax is paid by the
trustee.17
•  For a taxable distribution, the tax is paid by the
transferee.18
Regardless of liability for payment, the GSTT is a
charge on the property constituting the generation skipping
transfer unless the dispositive instrument directs otherwise
by specific reference to the generation skipping transfer
tax.19
FOOTNOTES
1 I.R.C. § 2631(a).  See 5 Harl,
Agricultural Law § 44.08
(1991).
2 I.R.C. § 2631.
3 I.R.C. § 2632.  Ltr. Rul. 9037058,
June 21, 1990 (unused exemption
allocated proportionately to non-
exempt portions of children's trusts).
4 I.R.C. § 2642.
5 Id.
6 I.R.C. § 2642(a)(2).  See Ltr. Rul.
9009007, Nov. 27, 1989 (disclaimer
effective to transfer property for
purposes of inclusion ratio).
7 I.R.C. § 2642(a)(2)(A).
8 I.R.C. §  2642(a)(2)(B).
9 Ltr. Rul. 9037058, June 21, 1990.
10 Ltr. Rul. 9007016, Nov. 16, 1989.
Compare Rev. Proc. 64-19, 1964-1
C.B. 682.
11 See note 8 supra.
12 I.R.C. § 2001(c)(1).
13 I.R.C. § 2001(c)(3).
14 I.R.C. § 2603.
15 I.R.C. § 2603(a)(3).
16 I.R.C. § 2603(a)(2).
17 Id.
18 I.R.C. § 2603(a)(1).
19 I.R.C. § 2603(b).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
EXEMPTIONS.  The debtor's interest in an ERISA
qualified retirement plan was not eligible for an exemption
under ERISA as a federal nonbankruptcy exemption.  In re
Brown, 130 B.R. 304 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991).
The debtor claimed a homestead in a residence of which a
portion of the two story garage was rented out as rooms.
The court held that the debtor was eligible to claim the
entire property for the homestead exemption because the
rented portion was not severable under local law which
zoned the property as a single family residence.  In re
Makarewicz, 130 B.R. 620 (Bankr. S.D. F la .
1991), aff'g on reh'ing , 126 B.R. 127 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1991).
  CHAPTER 11  
PLAN.  The farm debtors failed to submit a plan within
the 120 days after filing bankruptcy but filed a plan prior to
the creditors' filing of a liquidating plan.  The Bankruptcy
Court confirmed the creditors' plan and the debtors objected,
arguing that their plan should have been confirmed because
it was filed first.  The appellate court held that the
Bankruptcy Court properly considered both plans and
confirmed the creditors' plan as most appropriate.  In re
Tranel, 940 F.2d 1168 (8th Cir. 1991).
  CHAPTER 12  
ELIGIBILITY.  The debtors' pre-bankruptcy income
included social security benefits in excess of 50 percent of
the debtors' gross income which were excluded from gross
income on the debtors' tax returns.  The debtors' gross
income included income from discharge of indebtedness.
The court held that the social security benefits were included
in the debtors' gross income for purposes of Chapter 12
eligibility, even though the benefits were not included in the
debtors' taxable gross income.  In addition, the court held
that the taxable income from discharge of indebtedness was
not included in the debtors' income for purposes of Chapter
12, even though the discharge of indebtedness produced
taxable income.  The court focused primarily on whether the
item of income produced any actual cash income to the
debtors, instead of relying on whether the income was
included in gross income for federal tax purposes.  Query:
are social security benefits income or return of contributions
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and does not discharge of indebtedness result in an economic
benefit to the debtors?  Neither of these issues was raised by
the debtors or discussed by the court.  In re
Koenegstein, 130 B.R. 281 (Bankr. S.D. I l l .
1991) .
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
AUTOMATIC STAY .  After the debtors had filed
their bankruptcy petition and after the IRS had received
notice of the filing and had filed a claim in the case, the IRS
sent a Notice of Intention to Levy to the debtors.  Although
the IRS acknowledged that the levy was sent in error and
was a violation of the automatic stay, the IRS argued that
its sovereign immunity protected it from assessment of any
damages from the violation.  The court held that the
government had waived its immunity through 11 U.S.C. §
106(c).  See also Matter of Wilwerding, infra.  In re
Price, 130 B.R. 259 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff'g , 1 0 3
B.R. 989 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS.  The debtor sought to
recover as voidable transfers, under Section 547(b), amounts
collected by the IRS under a levy within 90 days of filing
bankruptcy.  The IRS argued that it was immune from such
actions under sovereign immunity which had not been
waived.  The court held that under Hoffman v. Connecticut
Income Maintenance Dept., 492 U.S. 96 (1989), the federal
government had not waived sovereign immunity from suit
under Section 106(c) for action under Section 547 for
monetary recovery.  See also In re Price, supra.  Matter o f
Wilwerding, 130 B.R. 294 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa
1991) .
CLAIMS.  After the IRS failed to file a claim for
taxes, the debtor filed a claim more than 30 days after the
bar date.  The debtor filed a claim for 1989 taxes and for
1990 estimated taxes which accrued after the bankruptcy
filing.  The court held that the debtor's filing was too late
because Rule 3004 allows a debtor to file a claim for a
creditor only within 30 days after the bar date for claims.  In
addition, Section 1305 allows only the creditor to file a
claim for post-petition claims, such as the estimated tax
claim.  In re Martin, 130 B.R. 349 (Bankr. M . D .
Fla. 1991).
DISCHARGE.  The court held that interest and
penalties accruing post-petition, pre-confirmation on pre-
petition nondischargeable taxes were also nondischargeable
in Chapter 11.  In re  Fox, 130 B.R. 571 (Bankr.
W.D. Wash. 1991).
NET OPERATING LOSSES .  As part of a
reorganization, shareholders of the debtor corporation formed
a successor corporation.  Under the debtor's Chapter 11 plan,
the successor corporation would make use of the debtor's net
operating loss carrybacks and carryforwards in order to
eliminate income tax for several years.  After confirmation
of the plan, the IRS issued proposed regulations prohibiting
use of net operating losses by successor corporations as part
of a scheme to avoid taxes, and the debtor sought a ruling
from the court that the Chapter 11 plan was not formulated
for the purpose of avoiding tax.  Although the court held
that the debtor could not bring a motion concerning tax
avoidance under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b), the court held that the
order of confirmation included a ruling that the plan was
proposed in good faith and was not forbidden by law.  In
addition, the court held that the IRS was prohibited from
raising the issue under 11 U.S.C. § 1144 because more than
180 days had passed since confirmation of the plan.  In re
McLean Indus., Inc., 91-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,465 (S.D. N.Y. 1991).
PRIORITY.  The debtor argued that a tax liability for
which a return was due more than three years before the
debtor filed for bankruptcy was dischargeable.  The IRS
argued that the three year period was tolled during the times
the debtor had filed previous bankruptcy cases during the
time between the date the return was due and the filing of
the current bankruptcy case.  The court agreed with the IRS
and held the taxes to be nondischargeable because the time
between the date the returns were due and the current filing
for bankruptcy was less than three years after subtracting the
time the debtor had pending bankruptcy cases.  Matter o f
Ross, 130 B.R. 312 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1991).
TRUSTEE. A trustee was assigned to oversee the
operation and liquidation of a debtor business.  During the
tenure as trustee, the business failed to pay all federal
employee withholding taxes and the IRS assessed the trustee
for the 100 percent penalty as a responsible person.  The
trustee sought clarification of duties to determine that the
trustee was not responsible for payment of the taxes.  The
court held that the bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction over
the case because the trustee was not a debtor and the issue
was substantially a federal tax question.  Hoffman v .
U.S., 130 B.R. 526 (W.D. Wis. 1991).
CONTRACTS
BREACH OF WARRANTY.  The plaintiff had
entered into a bailment contract with a third party to plant
and grow lima beans using seeds purchased by the third
party from the defendant.  However, when the third party's
financial status became uncertain and before planting the
seeds, the plaintiff contracted with the defendant for the
defendant to purchase lima beans produced by the plaintiff
which met U.S. No. 1 grade standards.  The purchase
agreement had a disclaimer typed at the top disclaiming any
expressed or implied warranty.  Because the seeds were
planted late, the seeds did not produce a crop before frost and
the plaintiff sued the defendant for the loss under breach of
implied warranty of fitness.  The court held that no breach
occurred because under the contract, the defendant was the
purchaser and not the seller and because the disclaimer was
effective to disclaim any implied warranty of the seeds'
fitness for a crop where the plaintiff was located.
Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 8 1 4
P.2d 917 (Idaho 1991).
GOOD FAITH DEALING.  The defendant defaulted
on a loan from the plaintiff secured with dairy cows.  The
defendant arranged for a third party to purchase the cows and
resell the cows to the defendant and requested, under Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 79.2080, the plaintiff to supply information
about the loan for use in the sale.  The plaintiff failed to
comply with the request until one day before requiring the
defendant to turnover the collateral for sale.  The failure to
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provide the information caused the sale of the cows to the
third party to fall through.  The lower appellate court upheld
the trial judgment that the plaintiff breached its duty of good
faith and fair dealing in failing to promptly provide the
information where the information was readily available.
The higher appellate court, however, reversed and remanded
the case because the transaction was subject to the U.C.C.
standard of subjective good faith of honesty in fact and in
conduct in U.C.C. transactions.  The case was remanded
because an issue of fact remained as to whether the bank
prevented the defendant from redeeming the cows by failing
to inform the defendant of the payoff amount.   U.S. Nat'l
Bank v. Boge, 311 Or. 550, 814 P.2d 1 0 8 2
(1991), rev'g and rem'g , 794 P.2d 801 (Or. C t .
App. 1990).
FEDERAL
AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER'S RIGHTS.  The debtors defaulted on
a loan to the defendant bank and the bank foreclosed upon
the property.  The bank offered the debtors the right of first
refusal to repurchase the property under the Agricultural
Credit Act of 1987 but the parties were unable to agree on
the price.  The bank then sold the property to third parties
and the debtors filed an action to prevent the sale for
violation of the 1987 Act.  The debtors also filed a lis
pendens against the property.  The case was dismissed and
although the debtors appealed, the debtors did not file a stay
of judgment pending the appeal.  The bank completed the
sale to the third parties and the deed was recorded.  The court
held that the appeal was moot because the lis pendens, under
Illinois law, was dissolved by the final judgment in the trial
court.  Duncan v. Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis ,
940 F.2d 1099 (7th Cir. 1991).
WETLANDS.  Fourteen farmers had petitioned their
local watershed district for permission to drain 85 acres of
wetlands but were prevented by passage of the Food Security
Act of 1985.  The farmers sought a determination from
ASCS that the draining would meet the pre-1985
commencement exception of 16 U.S.C. § 3822(b).
Although the county committee denied the exception, the
state committee approved the exception and the draining
project was completed.  The national office, however,
reviewed the project and determined that the exception did
not apply but allowed the farmers some relief from the
ineligibility penalties resulting from the conversion of the
wetlands.  The plaintiffs in this case challenged the relief
provided by the national ASCS as beyond the authority of
the statute.  After judgment was obtained for the plaintiffs
and before this appeal, the Food, Agriculture, Conservation
and Trade Act of 1990 was enacted which provided relief for
good faith violations of the wetlands provisions.  The
appellate court vacated and remanded the case and held that
the FACTA 1990 provision could be retroactively applied to
violations, thus permitting the relief provided by the ASCS
in this case.  National Wildlife Fed. v. ASCS, 9 4 1
F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1991).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION.  The decedent's will
established a split interest trust with the decedent's sisters
and a charitable foundation as beneficiaries.  Although the
trust as established would not qualify for the charitable
deduction under Section 2055, the trial court held that the
property which was actually transferred to the foundation
outside of the trust before the closing of the estate was
eligible for the deduction.  The appellate court reversed,
holding that the estate was not eligible for the deduction
because the trust did not qualify as a charitable remainder
annuity trust, a charitable remainder unitrust or a pooled
income fund and the charitable interest was not subject to
valuation.  Est. of Johnson v. U.S., 91-2 U . S .
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,084 (5th Cir. 1991) ,
rev'g , 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 6 0 , 0 3 2
(S.D. Miss. 1990).
GIFT.  In 1952, the decedent agreed to allow a daughter
to live on and farm land owned by the decedent.  The
daughter and husband paid for the operation of the farm and
did not charge or pay the decedent for rent.  The decedent
later transferred by deed the homestead of the farm for no
consideration, although the daughter granted the decedent a
mortgage which was not supported by a promissory note.
The court held that the transfer was a gift because the
mortgage was unsupported by an enforceable promissory
note and the daughter had no intention of paying the
mortgage amount to the decedent.  Est. of Holmes v .
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-477.
The grantor transferred stock in a farm corporation in
trust to members of the grantor's family.  The grantor
retained the power to appoint successor trustees but the
other trustees had the power to determine distributions and
accumulations of trust income and corpus and had broad
powers to manage the trust property.  Under a
conservatorship of the grantor, one of the grantor's sons
obtained a court order amending the trust to relinquish the
grantor's power to appoint successor trustees and to receive
any income or corpus from the trust.  The court held that
the court ordered relinquishment of the grantor's power to
appoint successor trustees and the right to receive trust
income caused the gift of the stock to the trust to become
complete.  Est. of Vak v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
1991-503 .
The decedent transferred stock to several individuals,
apparently to make use of multiple federal gift tax annual
exclusions, who signed the stock certificates in blank so
that the stock could be reissued to the decedent's family.
The court upheld a jury verdict that the transfers were gifts
to the family members subject to federal gift tax and were
fraudulent attempts to evade taxes.  Heyen v. U.S., 9 1 -
2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,085 (10th Cir .
1991), aff'g , 731 F. Supp. 1488 (D. Kan. 1990).
GROSS ESTATE.  In 1952, the decedent agreed to
allow a daughter to live on and farm land owned by the
decedent.  The daughter and husband paid for the operation of
the farm and did not charge or pay the decedent for rent.  The
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decedent later transferred by deed the homestead of the farm
for no consideration, although the daughter granted the
decedent a mortgage which was not supported by a
promissory note.  The estate claimed that the farm was not
included in the gross estate because the daughter acquired the
farm by adverse possession.  The court held that the farm
was included in the gross estate, except as to portions
transferred, because under state law, the daughter could not
gain ownership of the land by adverse possession where
possession was by permission of the decedent.  Est. o f
Holmes v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-477.
MARITAL DEDUCTION.  The decedent bequeathed
stock in a company in trust to the decedent's spouse with a
remainder to the decedent's son.  The son, however, received
the voting rights to the stock with the spouse receiving the
remainder interest in the voting rights.  If the son was
unable or unwilling to continue the day-to-day management
of the company, the trustee was to sell the stock at book
value to the son.  The IRS ruled that the son had the right,
by certifying that the son was unwilling to continue
managing the company, to obtain a bargain purchase of the
stock at book value.  This power of the son was ruled
equivalent to a power to appoint a portion of the trust
property to someone other than the surviving spouse.  In
addition, because the future book value of the stock was not
ascertainable, the surviving spouse's interest in the trust was
not a right to income from a specific sum or a specific
portion of the trust property.  The IRS rejected the estate's
argument that book value was intended to mean the book
value as of the decedent's death.  The IRS noted that even if
date of death book value was used, the spouse's interest did
not have an adequate right to income because the son
controlled the voting rights of the stock which controlled
the dividends. The IRS ruled that the surviving spouse's
interest in the trust was not QTIP.  Ltr. Rul. 9139001 ,
April 30, 1991.
The decedent's taxable estate included property passing to
the spouse under the will which was not eligible for the
marital deduction and property held by the decedent and
surviving spouse as tenants by the entireties which passed
outside of the will and which was eligible for the marital
deduction.  The decedent's will stated that real property
passing under the will was not to be used to pay any state or
federal estate taxes; however, the residuary estate was
insufficient to pay the taxes due.  The estate allocated the
remaining taxes against the entireties property, arguing that
under Virginia law, the decedent could not encumber the
entireties property without the consent of the spouse.  The
court initially held that federal law controlled and that the
decedent's provision that taxes were not to be charged
against the real property passing under the will required the
remaining taxes to be charged against the property passing
outside of the will, thus decreasing the property eligible for
the marital deduction.  On rehearing, the court vacated the
earlier decision and held that state law controlled and that the
decedent did not have the power under state law to subject
the entireties property to the estate taxes.  Est. of Reno,
91-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,083 (4th Cir .
1991), vac'g on reh'ing, 916 F.2d 955 (4th Cir .
1990) .
SPECIAL USE VALUATION.  The decedent
owned wooded lands enrolled in a state contract designating
the land as forest cropland, which required the decedent to
remove underbrush and mature and overmature trees by
1990.  The estate elected to value the wooded land under the
special use valuation rules.  The special use election was
denied because neither the decedent nor any qualified heir
planted, cultivated or harvested the trees from the property.
Est. of Holmes v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-
477 .
The decedent's will bequeathed so much of the decedent's
estate which equaled the maximum marital deduction with
the remainder to pass to the decedent's children.  As a result,
not all of the decedent's farm land eligible for special use
valuation passed to the surviving spouse; some passed to
the children.  However, on the special use election return
none of the children was identified as having a present
interest in the specially valued land.  The court held that the
special use valuation was ineffective because the estate
return did not substantially comply with the election
requirements.  Parker v. U.S., 91-2 U.S. Tax Cas .
(CCH) ¶ 60,082 (E.D. Ark. 1991).
TRANSFERS WITHIN THREE YEARS OF
DEATH.  The decedent had established a revocable trust
with income to be distributed to the decedent for life and
with the decedent having the power to require distributions
of trust income and principal.  The remainder of the trust
would pass to the decedent's spouse or family in trust.
Within three years of death, the decedent instructed the
trustee to make several transfers of trust property to third
parties as gifts.  The IRS ruled that the pre-death transfers
were includible in the decedent's gross estate.  Ltr. R u l .
9139002, June 14, 1991.
TRUST DISTRIBUTIONS.  Under the terms of the
trust, the beneficiary was to receive net income at least
annually, one-half of the trust corpus at age 37 and the
remainder of trust corpus at age 45.  Because the
whereabouts of the beneficiary was unknown, the co-trustee
made the net income payments to a separate bank account
for the beneficiary and distributed income and corpus to that
account.  The IRS ruled that in the taxable years that only
net income was distributed, the trust was a simple trust
allowed a deduction from taxable income for the
distributions.  In the taxable years trust corpus was
distributed, the trust was a complex trust and was  allowed
deductions under Section 661(a).  The IRS ruled that the co-
trustee was not required to file an income tax return for
income distributed to or earned by the separate bank account.
Ltr. Rul. 9138034, June 30, 1991.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION.  The taxpayers
granted to a nonprofit organization a scenic easement over a
portion of their property which restricted the development of
the property.  The IRS denied the charitable deduction for
the value of the easement, arguing that the taxpayers lacked
donative intent in that the easement was granted in order to
enhance the value of their property and to obtain the tax
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deduction and the transfer was without an exclusive
conservation purpose.  The court held that the transfer had
an exclusive conservation purpose because the easement was
granted to an organization devoted to conserving the
property.  The court also found that the transfers had the
requisite donative intent in that the granting of the easement
reduced the fair market value of the property.  McLennan
v. U.S., 91-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 5 0 , 4 4 7
(Cls. Ct. 1991).
COOPERATIVES.  An exempt agricultural
cooperative sold its assets and had proceeds and assets
remaining after payment of creditors.  The cooperative
proposed to allocate the proceeds to members of the
cooperative during the years the cooperative was in business
back to a point before which the cooperative's records were
no longer complete.  During this period the cooperative did
no business with or for nonmembers.  The IRS held that the
allocations would be deductible under I.R.C. § 1382(c)(2)(A)
and would not affect the cooperative's tax exempt status.
Ltr. Rul. 9138014, June 18, 1991.
A citrus cooperative invested temporary excesses of
funds in a citrus processor corporation of which the
cooperative was a member and patron and invested in money
market funds.  The investments were made only for a safe
and temporary placement of funds pending end-of-season
distributions.  The court held that the dividends from the
investments were patronage sourced income.  Dundee
Citrus Growers Ass'n v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
1991-487 .
ESOP'S .  The taxpayers formed a corporation to
operate a farm on which oil was discovered.  The
corporation established an ESOP with one of the taxpayers
as trustee.  The ESOP purchased some of the land from the
taxpayers and leased it to the corporation.  The court held
that the sale of the land to the ESOP was a prohibited
transaction causing excise tax to be assessed against the
taxpayers under I.R.C. § 4975(a).  Zabolotny v .
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-483.
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT.  The taxpayers
were denied an investment tax credit for lighting systems
leased to governmental units.  Musco Sports Lighting,
Inc. v. Comm'r, 91-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) (8th
Cir. 1991), aff'g , T.C. Memo. 1990-331.
Taxpayers, sole shareholders of an S corporation, were
not allowed to claim investment tax credit for equipment
purchased by the corporation because the taxpayers were not
at risk for loans of the corporation guaranteed by the
taxpayers.  Under state law, the taxpayers had a claim
against the corporation if they would be required to pay on
the guarantees.  Goatcher v. U.S., 91-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,450 (10th Cir. 1991).
PARTNERSHIPS
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP.  The IRS has announced
that Georgia has enacted legislation which corresponds to
the Uniform Limited Partnership Act for purposes of Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-2.  Rev. Rul. 91-51, I.R.B. 1991-
38, 4.
RETIREMENT PLANS .  For plans beginning in
September 1991 the weighted average is 8.54 with the
permissible range of 7.68 to 9.39 for purposes of
determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. §
412(c)(7).  Notice 91-30, I.R.B. 1991-39, 6.
The taxpayer elected to receive payments from a qualified
retirement trust in an annuity payable over several years.
The Court held that the taxpayer was not entitled to use the
10-year averaging method of declaring income from the trust
but must declare a portion of each annual payment as
income and a portion as return of contribution.  Twombly
v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-416.
RESPONSIBLE PERSON.  The taxpayer, husband
and wife, incorporated a cement contracting business in
which the taxpayers served as officers and sole owners
(although the corporation did not issue stock).  Both
taxpayers had access to the corporation bank account and
knowledge that federal employment taxes were not being
paid.  The taxpayers argued that they were not liable for the
100 percent responsible person penalty because their
payment of the employment taxes was prevented by
restrictions on amounts they received from the general
contractors which did not provide funds for payment of the
employment taxes.  The court held that the restrictions were
not sufficient excuse where the corporation made payments
to other creditors before paying the employment taxes.  The
court also held that the 100 percent penalty was not
dischargeable in bankruptcy.  In re  Fernandez, 91 -2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,476 (W.D. Mich.
1991) .
The debtor was a manager for a short time of a restaurant
owned and operated by a corporation.  Although the debtor
was an officer and shareholder in a corporation which had
shareholders and officers in the restaurant-owning
corporation, the debtor was not a shareholder or officer in
the  restaurant-owning corporation.  The debtor did not have
access to the restaurant's bank accounts and had authority
over hiring only restaurant waitresses.  The court held that
the debtor was not a responsible person liable for the 100
percent penalty for failure of the restaurant to pay
withholding taxes.  In re  Brown, 130 B.R. 4 5 6
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991).
The taxpayer was president and one-third owner of a
corporation.  The corporation obtained a line of credit with a
bank which was used to pay creditors, employees and
employment withholding taxes.  Although the taxpayer
admitted being a responsible person for purposes of the 100
percent penalty for failure of the corporation to pay
employment taxes, the taxpayer argued that the failure was
not willful because the bank refused to allow the corporation
to withdraw funds from the line of credit to pay the
employment taxes and the corporation had no other source
of funds to pay the taxes.  The court held that the taxpayer
had willfully failed to pay the taxes because the taxpayer had
acquiesced in the payment of other creditors while knowing
that employment taxes were not being paid.  McDonald
v. U.S., 91-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 5 0 , 4 7 2
(11th Cir. 1991).
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SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
OCTOBER 1991
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 6.14 6.05 6.00 5.98
110% AFR 6.77 6.66 6.61 6.57
120% AFR 7.39 7.26 7.20 7.15
Mid-term
AFR 7.54 7.40 7.33 7.29
110% AFR 8.31 8.14 8.06 8.01
120% AFR 9.08 8.88 8.78 8.72
Long-term
AFR 8.09 7.93 7.85 7.80
110% AFR 8.91 8.72 8.63 8.57
120% AFR 9.75 9.52 9.41 9.34
TAX LIENS.  The IRS held a lien against the
taxpayer's homestead for taxes owed by the taxpayer husband
but not by the taxpayer spouse.  The court held that the IRS
could foreclose against and sell the homestead where (1) the
husband's interest could not be sold alone, (2) the spouse
had participated in fraudulent attempts to convey the
homestead, (3) the relocation costs of the spouse would not
be excessive, and (4) the husband's attempt to waive his
homestead rights were ineffective.  U.S. v. Anderson,
91-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,468 (D. S . D .
1991) .
WITHHOLDING TAXES .  The taxpayer owned a
logging company which treated its loggers as independent
contractors and did not withhold federal employment taxes
from compensation paid the workers.  The IRS contested the
classification in an audit of the corporation but an agent
agreed to offset from the total liability the amount of FICA
and FUTA taxes actually paid by the workers.  Although the
taxpayer obtained a signed Form 4669 from most of the
workers, the IRS did not include the amounts to reduce its
claim against the taxpayer in the current bankruptcy case.
The court held that in a bankruptcy case, the claimant has
the burden of proving its claim and that the IRS failed to
demonstrate that the loggers were employees and not
independent contractors.  In addition, the IRS failed to prove
the amount of its claim because it failed to consider the
amounts of FICA and FUTA taxes paid by the loggers.  In
re  Rasbury, 91-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,454
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1991).
The IRS has announced that it will be sending out
requests for proper taxpayer identification numbers for
payees who reported incorrect numbers.  Taxpayers who do
not respond to the request with a proper number will be
subject to 20 percent backup withholding.  Taxpayers who
have already received a second notice and who have not filed
a correct number are subject to backup withholding.  IR
91-100, September 23, 1991.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
TRESPASS .  The plaintiff leased 55 acres from the
defendant and had enrolled 15 acres in a federal set aside
program which were planted in a cover crop of oats.
Another tenant of the defendant talked to the defendant about
moving the set aside acres to 15 acres leased by the third
party and planting the original set aside acres with beans.
The defendant agreed to this and the third party obtained
permission from the ASCS to move the set aside acres
without the plaintiff's permission or knowledge.  The
plaintiff still received the same federal program payments
but sued the defendant for trespass and breach of the lease.
The court held that the defendant's knowledge and
acquiescence in the moving of the set aside acres was
sufficient to prove trespass against the defendant.  Freese
v. Buoy, 576 N.E.2d 1176 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991).
MINERAL RIGHTS
SUBSIDENCE.  The plaintiff suffered damage to crop
and pasture land from subsidence of mine shafts dug by the
defendant under the plaintiff's property.  The mines were dug
under mineral rights granted by the plaintiff's successor in
title.  The mineral deed had a clause relieving the mineral
estate owner of any duty to provide subjacent support and
any liability for subsidence.  The plaintiff argued that the
Surface Coal Mining Land Conservation and Reclamation
Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 96 1/2, ¶ 7901.01 et seq., made such
waiver of liability for subsidence against public policy.  The
court held that the SCMLCRA recognized the existence of
and permitted subsidence.  The court also upheld the validity
of the waiver of the duty of subjacent support.  Rocking
M Ranch, Inc. v. Sahara Coal Co., 576 N.E.2d
1120 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991).
MORTGAGES
RECEIVER.  The plaintiff filed a foreclosure action
against the defendant to foreclose three mortgages against
farmland owned by the defendant.  The defendant leased all
but 62 acres of the land.  The plaintiff filed a motion for
appointment of a receiver.  The court held that under Ind.
Code § 34-1-12-1(4), a receiver was required because the
property was not occupied by the defendant as a principal
residence and the land was leased to third parties.  Farver
v. DeKalb County Farm Bureau, 576 N.E.2d
1361 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
COMBINES.  The plaintiff was injured while
attempting to clean an unloading auger on a combine when
the plaintiff's father engaged the auger.  The plaintiff sued
the combine manufacturer but did not sue the father.  The
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff but found the
manufacturer only 50 percent at fault, the father 30 percent
at fault and the plaintiff 20 percent at fault.  The trial court
then awarded 50 percent of the damages to the plaintiff to
the extent of the manufacturer's fault.  The plaintiff
appealed, arguing that the manufacturer should also have
been assessed for the father's fault under joint and several
liability of Iowa Code § 668.4.  The appellate court held
that because Iowa Code § 668.4 refers only to situations
where the defendant is less than 50 percent at fault, the
statute could not be read to require joint and several liability
where the defendant is 50 percent or more at fault.
Christopherson v. Deere & Co., 941 F.2d 6 9 2
(8th Cir. 1991).
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SECURED
TRANSACTIONS
PRIORITY.  In June 1983, the debtors signed a
security agreement granting the bank a security interest in
crops growing or to be grown on specified land.  The
security interest was perfected.  The debtor signed two
promissory notes in August 1985 which were due in
February 1986.  The debtors received supplies used to
produce the 1986 crop from a supplier and granted the
supplier a security interest in the 1986 crop which was
perfected.  The 1986 crops were planted from April to May
1986.  The court held that the term "due" in U.C.C. § 9-
312(2) meant "overdue" and that because the bank's
promissory notes were not overdue more than six months
prior to the time the collateral crops became growing crops,
the bank's security interest was superior to the supplier's
security interest.  First Nat'l Bank of Joliet v .
Associated Stockdale Cos., 577 N.E.2d 524 ( I l l .
Ct. App. 1991).
REPLEVIN.  The defendant was a co-owner of farm
equipment and machinery in the possession of the other co-
owners.  The other co-owners granted a security interest in
the property to the plaintiff bank which filed an action in
replevin to recover the property after the other co-owners
defaulted on some loans.  Under a court order the property
was seized and sold at auction and the defendant sought
actual and punitive damages for the sale of the property.
The court held that the jury award of punitive damages was
improper where the replevin and sale of the property was
made pursuant to law and a court order.  The court noted
that the other co-owners had sufficient interest in the
property to grant a security interest and this security interest
gave the plaintiff the right to replevin and sell the property,
subject to payment to the defendant of the defendant's
interest in the property.  Community Bank o f
Chillicothe v. Campbell, 813 S.W.2d 40 (Mo .
Ct. App. 1991).
CITATION UPDATES
The Circle K Corp. v. U.S., 23 Cls. Ct. 6 6 5
(1991) (capital assets), see p. 116 supra.
ISSUE INDEX
Bankruptcy
General
Exemptions
  Homestead 178
  Pension plan 178
Chapter 11
Plan 178
Chapter 12
Eligibility 178
Federal taxation
Automatic stay 179
Avoidable transfers 179
Claims 179
Discharge 179
Net operating losses 179
Priority 179
Trustee 179
Contracts
Breach of warranty 179
Good faith dealing 179
Federal Agricultural Programs
Borrower's rights 180
Wetlands 180
Federal Estate and Gift Tax
Charitable deduction 180
Gift 180
Gross estate 180
Marital deduction 181
Special use valuation 181
Transfers within three years
of death 181
Trust distribution 181
Federal Income Taxation
Charitable deduction 181
Cooperatives 182
ESOP'S 182
Investment tax credit 182
 Partnerships
Limited partnership 182
Retirement plans 182
Responsible person 182
Safe harbor interest rates
October 1991  183
Tax liens 183
Withholding taxes 183
Landlord and Tenant
Trespass 183
Mineral Rights
Subsidence 183
Mortgages
Receiver 183
Products Liability
Combines 183
Secured Transactions
Priority 184
Replevin 184
